Discernible across the flux of history is a persistent trend: the proclivity of human groups to establish large-scale and durable political formations that rule over subject populations of different ethnicities, religions and cultures-in short, to build empires. On this narrow point, scholars appear to have achieved consensus. Such chronological and geographical scope, not to mention the range of disciplinary backgrounds and theoretical dispositions represented among our authors, is unusual in a book
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became known as the Holy Roman Empire was only destroyed a millennium later in 1806 by Napoleon I, who in turn appropriated the ideology and iconography of empire. 40 But to classify as empires only those polities that were content to describe themselves as such would be reductive, and not only because 'empire denial' is so common, 41 but more importantly because we would be left with an absurdly Eurocentric category restricted to the past two millennia. The usage would even be restrictive within continental Europe. Latin Christendom knew only one emperor, so while the Plantagenet kings of England were content to bask in the reflected glory of past empires, they did not formally style themselves as emperors. 42 Likewise, the name upon which the Spanish Hapsburgs settled for the assemblage of lands over which they ruled was not the Spanish 'empire' but the monarquia española-the 45 An alternative is definitional abstinence.
As Dominic Lieven has averred: 'Empire is a fine subject, peopled by leopards and other creatures of the wild. To reduce all this to definitions and formulas is to turn the leopard into a pussycat, and even then into an incomplete but misshapen pussycat with three legs and no tail'. 46 Lieven's approach holds some attraction for historians, who are instinctively chary of homogenizing disparate historical experiences. The danger is that, in the effort to avoid 14 producing a three-legged feline, we find ourselves, like Alice in Wonderland, pondering a grin without a cat-a political formation that identified itself as an empire or which drew on the imperial idea, but which does not really belong in the analytical category of empire because it has stopped short of, or passed through, 'empire-dom' in the course of its political development.
Rather than ducking the issue of definitions, we propose to reformulate the underlying methodological problem. Concepts are intellectual constructs, tools intended to assist the analysis of phenomena. Treating concepts as things in themselves creates an illusion of absolute categories, which in turn leads to fruitless debates over classification. Outside the modeling of the social sciences, historical empires only ever existed as particular forms of rule which for convenience we place into an analytical category. The task is not to define the word empire prescriptively so as to declare alternative usages out of bounds, but rather to make some basic distinctions that clarify how the concept is to be understood for present academic purposes-in other words to define the category of cases that are to be compared.
We have defined the analytical category of empire as 'an extended and durable polity in which a core society exercises formal and authoritarian power over subordinated peoples of outlying territories gained or maintained by coercion'. Empire, in this usage, is a 'family resemblance concept' embracing a disparate class of cases across many centuries, both modern and pre-modern, both Western and non-Western. 47 Our definition contains two core elements: an expansive, often unbounded, political structure; and formal a-symmetrical power relations between the dominant social group and its subject peoples. This distinguishes empire from the concept of the state as a territorially-bounded polity in which peoples are ruled more or less uniformly. 48 It is also distinct from 'hegemony', a word with the potential cause confusion because all-too often it serves as a fig-leaf for empires in denial. Even when
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hegemony is used as a real concept it has the potential to produce semantic chaos. There are at least three distinct meanings in current use: ideological preponderance (as in Gramscian hegemony); informal influence (as in the British informal empire or, latterly, American 'soft power'); and primacy over other theoretically-equal powers (a usage found principally in international relations and political science). 49 All three are distinct from our analytical category of empire.
Bureaucracy is the younger of our keywords. Originally coined in 1765 (Fr.
bureaucratie) to refer to a malady afflicting French government, the word quickly established itself as a term of disparagement for overbearing and inefficient officialdom. 50 It was received into English in the early nineteenth century with the precise meaning of 'office tyranny', and during the nineteenth century English writers tended to reserve the term to deprecate the 'bureaucracy-ridden' states of continental Europe. 51 In this respect, the career of bureaucracy as an attack word has much in common with 'imperialism', which first appeared in English in denunciation of the second French empire of Napoleon III (1852-70). 52 And like imperialism (which Sir Keith Hancock famously declared to be 'no word for scholars'), bureaucracy has occasionally been deemed to be so polyvalent and laden with negative associations that it is unfit for scholarly use.
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Bureaucracy gained acceptance as a word for scholars through the sociology of Max Weber (1864-1920), whose work casts a long shadow on all subsequent studies. 54 In his major and unfinished work of synthesis, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft ('Economy and society'), Weber sought to provide the tools for a comparative analysis of social power, notably a series of ideal-types-'ideal' in the sense of existing as an idea or archetype. As
Sam Whimster discusses below, the elements of the ideal type were intensified to throw into relief the salient features of real historical examples, which Weber maintained never occur in 16 a pure form. 55 The most famous of these ideal types was bureaucracy, which Weber set within a tripartite classification of 'legitimate domination' comprised of traditional, charismatic and legal-rational authority. 56 Bureaucracy in its pure ideal-typical form was a 'structure of domination' characteristic of legal-rational forms of authority, closely associated with 'modernity', and distinct from patrimonial administration, which he depicted as personal, traditional and normally pre-modern. Bureaucracy's success was attributable to its technical superiority to all other forms of organization. It was a precision instrument for achieving goals, the pinnacle of formal or 'means-end' rationality (G. Zweckrationalität). These various images of bureaucracy may appear to be discrepant, but each has a number of features that together form the analytical category of 'bureaucracy' with which the It was Talleyrand, the foreign minister of Napoleon I, who remarked in the course of a lecture on empire that: 'The art of putting men in their place is perhaps foremost in the science of government'. 60 Imperial bureaucracy was more alchemy than science. It was the art of transforming conquered populations into obedient subjects-of keeping people in their place (figuratively, but also sometimes quite literally through the regimentation and control of space) when they did not want to be ruled. A substantial literature on the 'colonial state' has emphasized the transformative power of colonial projects. The case studies presented in this volume suggest that the norm was a more tangled imperial administrative structure and hitand-miss bureaucratic process. Moving rather schematically outwards from the centre, the chapters suggest a general tendency towards a small and ramshackle organization at the imperial core; uncertain connections between metropole and colonies resulting in 'negotiation' rather than top-down imperative control; bureaucrats on the peripheries unable to penetrate too far without undermining their own authority; indigenous peoples displaying some capacity to turn bureaucracy to their own advantage; and, finally, the assimilation or acculturation of the conquerors giving rise to fears of 'contagion' spreading from the 
